United States, and of aiding and abetting the transportation of dynamite and nitro-glycerine in interstate commerce, in passenger trains and cars between different states of the United States, in violation of the federal statutes, to be used in blowing up buildings and works constructed by "open shop" concerns. On appeal to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals in Ryan *v.* United States, 216 Federal Reporter, 13, the judgment was reversed as to some defendants and affirmed as to others. One of the peculiar holdings in the case related to the admissibility of evidence, and was to the effect that evidence of a chain of explosions throughout the United States, alleged to have occurred by means of dynamite and nitroglycerine, while admissible as circumstantial evidence to support the charges specified in the indictments, should be limited to that purpose, since the offenses involved in the explosions themselves were offenses against and punishable only under the laws of the states and by the state courts.

Constitutionality of the Iowa "Blue Sky Law."—A suit was brought in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa (William R. Compton Co. *v.* Allen, 216 Federal, 537) against the Secretary of State and Attorney General to restrain the enforcement of the "Blue Sky Law" enacted by the 35th General Assembly. Plaintiff alleged that the law was unconstitutional in that (1) it violated the fourteenth amendment by depriving persons of property without due process of law and denied the equal protection of the law; (2) that it imposed a burden upon interstate commerce; (3) that it granted privileges to citizens of Iowa denied to citizens of sister states. The court, in a somewhat summary manner, disposed of the case by holding that stock, bonus, and other securities were subjects of interstate commerce, and that the act by requiring investment companies to submit their business methods to examination, by requiring a certificate and a filing fee before being allowed to transact business in Iowa, imposed a burden upon interstate commerce. The court further held that the measure could not be sustained as an inspection act. Other grounds urged against the law were disposed of in a summary manner or left undecided.

An Election Tangle.—State ex rel. Maxson *v.* Brodigan (Supreme Court of Nevada) 143 Pacific Reporter, 306, presents a rather amusing election tangle. In the words of the court: "Late in the day or night of Saturday, August 1, 1914, which was the last day for filing nomination papers, McKay and Raymond A. Gott each filed his nomination paper for the Republican nomination for the office of attorney general, and paid the filing fee of $100. On the following Monday, August 3d., Gott filed with the secretary of state his pur-

ported withdrawal from the nomination, and about half an hour later McKay filed with the secretary of state his purported withdrawal from the nomination. Acting pursuant to the order of this court, the secretary of state, on August 9th, refused to accept the purported withdrawal of McKay. In our decision, in the proceedings which resulted in that order we said: 'In the case at bar, as we view it, there was nothing in the law which would prevent the first party applying to withdraw from having the application complied with. In other words, Raymond A. Gott, having applied to the secretary of state to have his name withdrawn, could, in our judgment, properly have that request complied with. As soon, however, as his name was withdrawn, the other party to the contest for Republican nomination, namely, Richard A. McKay, became, by operation of the law (subdivision 9, c. 14), the party nominee for the office of attorney general, and, having become the party nominee, under the statute and under the rule as laid down by this court in the case of Donnelley *v.* Hamilton [33 Nev. 418, 111 Pac. 102], supra, he could not withdraw.' State ex rel. Thatcher *v.* Brodigan, 37 Nev. —, 142 Pac. 522. Gott now asks for a writ of prohibition restraining the secretary of state from certifying or causing to be placed or printed the name of McKay upon the official ballot as the nominee of the republican party for attorney general, because of his failure to file a statement of his campaign expenses under the law relating to the purity of elections passed at the last session of the Legislature. The court held that inasmuch as McKay became the Republican nominee to be placed on the ballot for the general election, and as no one opposed him, he was not a candidate for the primary election, after the withdrawal of Gott. Consequently, McKay was not a candidate for the nomination at the time the names of candidates for the nomination were certified and printed on the primary election ballot. Therefore we conclude that, under the language of the statute providing that 'every candidate for nomination or election to public office * * * shall five days before and fifteen days after the election at which he is a candidate,' file a statement, McKay, not being a candidate for the nomination at those times, and having no contest or interest in the primary election, was not required to file a statement, either five days before or fifteen days after the primary election."

Disappointed Candidate Seeks to Recover Damages.—A rather novel question is presented to the Kentucky Court of Appeals in the case of Brodie *v.* Haswell, 169 Southwestern Reporter, 856. Plaintiff was nominated by a convention of the Republican party in the year 1909 for the office of circuit court clerk. For some reason his name was not included in the certificate of candidates prepared by the chairman and secretary of the convention to be filed with the